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Abstract
This paper analyses in a VAR framework with debt feedback effects of fiscal policy over 1999q1-
2013q4 in five Central and East European economies: Slovakia, Czech republic, Hungary, Slove-
nia and Lithuania. The results are compared to two alternative specifications, a model without
debt feedback, and a model with debt within the linear VAR. Omitting the debt feedback would
affect the magnitude and sign of the impulse response coefficients, especially those of GDP, gov-
ernment revenue and interest rate. Simulated out-of-sample debt paths are stabilised if debt
feedback is included, but strongly explosive otherwise.
JEL: C32, E37, E62, H63.
Keywords: fiscal policy, structural VAR, debt dynamics, endogenous debt feedback, impulse re-
sponse functions, historical decomposition of times series, meta-analysis, CEE countries, new EU
member states
1 Motivation
As until the Great Recession 2008-09, public debt ratios in new EU member countries were typically
associated with levels of about 20-30 percent GDP. There were exceptions, such as e.g. Hungary
and Poland, but their relatively high debt ratios followed a declining trend. Fiscal stimuli with the
aim to curtail the crisis led to a marked increase in government indebtedness. As a consequence,
also in the Eastern part of the EU debt ratios of about 40-75 percent GDP became a rule rather
than exception.
Levels of debt may have important implications for fiscal policy effects on the economy. Large
panel studies find that high debt would limit the effectiveness of fiscal policy (e.g. Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko, 2013, or Nickel and Tudyka, 2014). A related, puzzling problem is whether high
debt itself poses a challenge for economic growth. Some authors, as e.g. Panizza and Presbitero
(2014), deny a negative causal effect between debt and growth. Some other authors find that there
are thresholds in the relationship of public debt and GDP, above which debt may have negative
impact on subsequent growth. An example for the OECD countries is due to Elmeskov and Suther-
land (2012), who identified such thresholds in the debt ratio at around 45 and 66 percent GDP.
Notwithstanding the general disagreement on this issue, such debt ratios match those observed in
the enlarged part of the EU. Therefore, government indebtedness deserves a closer attention.
The obvious question that arises is what impact does debt exert to effects of fiscal policy in the
new EU members. The impact will translate into estimates of impulse response functions and joint
forecasts of macroeconomic and fiscal variables.
A convenient framework to address this issue is provided by Favero and Giavazzi (2007), hence-
forth FG. The authors extended the traditional VAR setup of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) for a
nonlinear equation, the government budget constraint. Keeping track of its implications for the
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policy analysis is not a new problem, see e.g. Bohn (1998) and Sims (1998) and references herein.
The FG framework can be viewed as a modeling minimum to get the economy, fiscal variables and
debt to endogenously affect each other. If the nonlinear effects stemming from the debt dynamics
are indeed significant, traditional models omitting debt will give misleading results. Recent appli-
cations of the FG model include e.g. Afonso and Souza (2012) for the U.S., the U.K., Germany and
Italy, and Parkyn and Vehbi (2014) for the New Zealand.
Modified versions of the FG framework were applied to two countries of the Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE). Ilzetzki (2011) estimates fiscal policy effects under debt feedback for Estonia and
four developing countries. Inclusion of the debt feedback for Estonia amplified the response of GDP
and inflation to fiscal shocks. In an application to the Czech republic, Melecky and Melecky (2011)
work with a linearised budget constraint. However, rather than characterising fiscal policy effects,
they only discuss the responses of the debt ratio to shocks in other variables. Overall, interactions
of the government debt, fiscal policy and the economy have not prominently deserved attention
in the CEE-literature. Empirical papers that investigate fiscal policy effects in new EU members
use the traditional VAR model and identification scheme following Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
Details are listed in Table 1. Government debt is not included in the specification. For some
of the countries, effects of fiscal shocks were estimated by means of theoretical New-Keynesian
models. Examples include Stork and Zavacka (2010), Klyuev and Snudden (2011) and Ambrisko
et al. (2012) for the Czech republic, Algozhina (2012) and Benk and Jakab (2012) for Hungary,
and Clancy, Jacquinot and Lozej (2014) for Slovenia. Such models are very data intensive, which
makes estimation and comparison for a larger number of economies inconvenient. Rather than
discussing the impact of debt, the main focus of the studies was to simulate propagation of fiscal
shocks under a detailed break-down of the fiscal instruments.
With the aim to improve our knowledge on the role of debt dynamics, this paper analyses fiscal
policy effects under explicit debt feedback over 1991q1-2013q4 in five Central and East European
countries (CEE-5): Slovakia, Czech republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Lithuania. The model in Sec-
tion 2 is an application of the FG framework. In order to track the impact of debt feedback, two
alternative specifications are considered, a model without debt feedback, and a model with debt
within the linear VAR. Section 3 presents a rich set of empirical results, that have not been brought
up before, such as response functions of variables to debt shocks and historical decomposition of
the time series under debt feedback. Unlike in linear VAR models, the response functions depend
on the size and sign of the shocks and on the initial conditions, pointing to nonlinearities involved
with the government debt dynamics. Both inclusion of the debt feedback and the way it is im-
plemented matter to the estimated behaviour of other variables. In particular, impulse responses
of GDP, interest rate and government revenue are larger under debt feedback and might revert
signs. Simulated out-of-sample debt paths are stabilised under debt feedback, but strongly explo-
sive if debt feedback is omitted. The final section draws concluding remarks and suggests areas for
further research.
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Table 1: Empirical papers on fiscal policy effects in the CEE-5
Authors Coverage Sample
range
Macroeconomic variables Fiscal variables
(government)
Baxa (2010) Czech r. 1998q1-
2009q2
GDP, GDP deflator, 3-m
interest rate
revenue, expenditure
Franta (2012) Czech r. 1999q1-
2011q3
GDP, inflation, interest rate net taxes, spending
Lendvai (2007) Hungary 1997q1-
2005q4
GDP, private consumption,
investment, employment,
GDP deflator, REER
net taxes, expenditure,
consumption, investment,
public wages
Kotosz and Peak
(2013)
Hungary 1960-2011 GDP expenditure
Klyviene and
Karmelavicius
(2012)
Lithuania 1997q1-
2011q1
GDP, employment, FDI corporate income tax
revenue, revenue from
other taxes, domestic and
comparative effective
corporate tax rate,
spending
Pecsyova (2013) Slovakia 1997q1-
2012q1
GDP, inflation, interest rate net taxes, spending
Jemec et al. (2011) Slovenia 1995q1-
2010q4
GDP net taxes, spending
Mirdala (2009) Czech r., Hungary,
Poland, Slovakia,
Bulgaria, Romania
2000q1-
2008q4
GDP, inflation, short-term
interest rate
revenue, expenditure
Eller et al. (2011) Czech r., Hungary,
Poland, Slovenia,
Slovakia
1995q1-
2009q4
GDP, short-term interest
rate, NEER,inflation
net taxes, spending, foreign
fiscal balance
Karmelavicius and
Klyviene (2012)
Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania
1997q1-
2011q4
(Lithuania)
GDP, employment, FDI corporate income tax
revenue, revenue from
other taxes, spending
Mirdala (2013) Bulgaria, Czech
r., Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia
2000q1-
2012q3
GDP, inflation, short-term
interest rate
revenue, expenditure
Bencik (2014) Visegrad countries 1997q4-
2012q4
net exports, RER spending
Dinu and Marinas
(2014)
Czech r., Hungary,
Poland, Slovenia,
Slovakia, Bulgaria,
Romania
1999q1-
2012q2
GDP, inflation, interest rate net taxes, spending
Note: Most of the papers follow in model specification and identification the structural approach of Blanchard
and Perotti (2002). In addition, Mirdala (2009; 2013) and Klyviene and Karmelavicius (2012) also use a
recursive Choleski scheme. Franta (2012) estimates the VAR reduced form by a hierarchical Bayesian approach
and identifies the model using three various schemes: a structural approach, a recursive scheme and sign
restrictions. Bencik (2014) uses a smoothed transition autoregressive model (STVAR) to compute dual regime
fiscal multipliers for recessions and expansions.
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2 Methodology
This section sets forth a fiscal VAR model with debt feedback in the vein of Favero and Giavazzi
(2007). As a distinctive feature, this approach incorporates the government budget constraint, an
identity that links dynamically and nonlinearly all variables included in the VAR model.
Omission of this constraint would have important consequences (cf. Favero and Giavazzi, 2007;
Afonso and Souza, 2012; Cherif and Hasanov, 2012; Parkyn and Vehbi, 2014). It would assume
zero effects of debt levels on output and inflation. It might bias the estimates of the VAR coeffi-
cients. Price level and long-term interest rates might not plausibly respond to fiscal shocks. Also,
it would rule out the possibility that government revenue and expenditure will react to debt levels
whenever fiscal authorities care about the sustainability of public finances. In turn, debt ratios
simulated from a VAR without debt feedback might turn explosive.
2.1 Fiscal VAR model with debt feedback
The model employed is a system of equations which consists of a fiscal SVARX model with govern-
ment debt as an exogenous variable, and of the government budget constraint.
The SVARX(k,l) model is specified in the reduced form as:
Xt = A0 + k∑
i=1Ai ⋅ Xt−i + l∑j=1Γj ⋅ bt−j +Ut (1)
where Xt is a vector in pit - inflation in the implicit GDP deflator, rt - interest rate, yt - real GDP, tt
- real government revenue, xt - real government primary expenditure, and mt - money growth; Ai
denotes coefficient matrix at the i-th lag of the endogenous variables and Γj is coefficient vector
at the j-th lag of real government debt bt; Ut is a vector of reduced-form residuals.
The motion of government debt follows:
bt = 1 + rt
1 + pit ⋅ bt−1 + xt − tt (2)
The nonlinear government budget constraint is included in the system as an identity. The idea is
to endogenise feedback from the debt dynamics in the linear SVARX. As a result, government debt
becomes an endogenous variable within the system.
Reduced-form residuals are linked to the underlying structural shocks Wt as P−1 ⋅Ut = Wt, where P
is an identification matrix.
2.2 Estimation and identification
In a first step, (1) is estimated as a usual reduced form vector autoregression. The model is then
identified using a triangular decomposition such that P is the lower Choleski factor of the residuals’
covariance matrix. Given the small sample context, estimator for the covariance matrix was scaled
down using the number of parameters.
Variables in the identification matrix are ordered as listed in Xt such that:q inflation, interest rate and real GDP are predetermined w.r.t. fiscal policy shocks,q government revenue is predetermined w.r.t. government expenditure,q money growth responds contemporaneously to fiscal shocks (cf. Afonso and Souza, 2012).
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2.3 Simulation
Simulation of the above system for a desired number of periods involves defining shocks Et and
initial conditions in Xt and bt, and iterating the following steps:
1. Using estimated VAR coefficients and identification matrix, solve forward
Xt = A0 + k∑
i=1Ai ⋅ Xt−i + l∑j=1Γj ⋅ bt−j + P ⋅ Et (3)
2. Compute government debt using the simulated VAR variables.
Various simulation results are obtained as follows:q In the baseline simulation, shocks are set zero.q Structural impulse response functions are constructed as the difference between a shock sce-
nario, where arbitrarily specified shocks occur at t = 0, and a baseline scenario.q Confidence intervals under debt feedback are constructed as the 10-th and 90-th percentile of
the impulse response distributions obtained by one-step bootstrapping in 1000 draws.q Forecast error variance decomposition under debt feedback is obtained from the estimated im-
pulse response coefficients and the covariance matrix of the reduced form residuals using the
standard formulae.q Historical decomposition of the variables is obtained as the difference between a shock scenario
using as Et the estimated structural shocks, and a baseline scenario.
2.4 Alternative specifications
In order to show the impact of debt feedback on the results, two alternative specifications are
considered:q First, a model labeled in further text as "without debt feedback". This specification is similar
to traditional fiscal models that have been used in the previous CEE-related literature. It is
estimated as (1) with debt as an exogenous variable, but in simulations the lags of debt are
omitted. It was used for demonstration purposes e.g. by Favero and Giavazzi (2007) and Afonso
and Souza (2012).q Second, a model labeled in further text as "debt in VAR". In this case, debt (in levels) is included
within the linear VAR as a seventh variable. This specification ignores the nonlinearity in the
debt equation. It makes a possibly strong assumption that impulse responses do not depend on
initial conditions. It was used for demonstration purposes e.g. by Cherif and Hasanov (2012).
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3 Empirical results
3.1 Data
Major part of the data set was obtained from Eurostat. This ensures that the definition of data
series is compatible across countries and that fiscal data are recorded on accrual basis. As a
particular advantage, Eurostat provides debt data expressed in euros which ensures accounting
consistency between EMEA and non-EMEA countries and across various currency denominations.
The choice of the variables for the linear VAR part reflects which variables enter the government
budget constraint. As yt, quarterly gross domestic product (B1GQ) is used, tt is the total gen-
eral government revenue (TR), and bt is the general government consolidated gross debt (GD).
Primary government expenditure xt was obtained as total general government expenditure (TE)
minus interest payments (D41). GDP, government revenue, primary expenditure and debt were
seasonally adjusted and deflated by the GDP deflator. Inflation and money growth were obtained
as quarter-over-quarter growth rates of the seasonally adjusted GDP price deflator (CPI05) and
of the money aggregate M2, respectively. Data on money supply were obtained from the central
banks’ databases and publications. Interest rate rt is the EMU convergence criterion bond yield
(MCBY) from Eurostat. Where unavailable (from 1999 to 2001 or 2002), the yields were ap-
proximated using long-term interest rates (IR3TIB) as obtained from the FRED database (Czech
republic, Hungary and Slovakia) or from the central bank (Slovenia). In the vector of endogenous
variables, rt is measured in percent per annum. In the debt equation, it is transformed to percent
per quarter. The data set spans over the period 1999q1-2013q4.
Figure 1 displays the historical evolution of the data series. Money and deflator growth rates were
mostly positive and stable, occasional larger swings were associated with the financial turmoil in
2001-02 and the Great Recession in 2008-09. The evolution of GDP, government revenue and
expenditure were linked rather closely as until 2008-09. Real GDP dropped sharply, given the
dependence of these small open economies on external demand, hurting the stream of government
revenue. From then on, government expenditure followed a diverging path, mostly exceeding the
revenue. As a result, the previously stable debt ratios plummeted, rising by 2013 close to the 60
percent threshold (Slovakia) or exceeding it by about 10 percent (Hungary, Slovenia). The relation
of interest rates and levels of debt seems inverted to what economic theory would dictate. The
highest debt levels have been associated with the historically lowest interest rates. The declining
trend in bond yields was distorted only by occasional crises, such as Slovenia 2001-02 (a turmoil
spread from Latin America), Hungary and Lithuania 2008-09 (the Great Recession), and Hungary
2011-12 (bond yields suffered under tensions in Europe and, subsequently, under a country-specific
crisis). Possible explanations for the steady decline in bond yields include the ongoing integration
efforts of the new EU members, and, more recently, monetary policy of the ECB pushing the interest
rates toward zero.
Table 2 reports rank correlation coefficients between variables included in the VAR and debt levels.
There is a medium to strong positive rank correlation in case of GDP and fiscal variables and
negative in case of the interest rate. Because the interest rate, GDP, fiscal variables and debt follow
a trend, in addition, rank correlation is reported after the endogenous variables and debt were
detrended (cf. e.g. Chiarella and Gao, 2002). This transformation reveals a positive correlation
between the interest rate and debt, whereas a negative correlation in case of output and fiscal
variables. Figure 2 captures these facts visually.
6
−10
0
10
Price −, money −−
growth (% q−o−q)
Czech r.
−10
0
15
Hungary
−10
0
10
Lithuania
−5
0
5
10
Slovenia
1999q1 2005q1 2011q1
−5
0
5
10
Slovakia
15
25
GDP
(levels)
10
15
20
50
5
8
1999q1 2005q1 2011q1
4.5
8.5
5
10
Revenue −, expend. −−
(levels)
5
10
8
18
2
4
1999q1 2005q1 2011q1
1.5
3
0
20
40
Debt (levels), bond
yield −− (% p.a., RHS)
0
5
10
20
50
5
12
0
50
100
0
10
20
0
5
10
15
20
0
5
10
15
20
1999q1 2005q1 2011q1
0
5
10
15
20
0
5
10
15
20
Figure 1: Historical data
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Figure 2: Phase graphs of the variables and government debt
7
Table 2: Correlation between the variables and debt levels
(a) (b)
pit rt yt τt xt mt rt yt τt xt
Czech r. -0.16 -0.60 0.78 0.78 0.78 -0.14 -0.24 -0.60 -0.37 -0.16
Hungary -0.15 -0.12 0.47 0.62 0.42 -0.37 0.29 0.19 0.26 0.18
Lithuania -0.32 -0.25 0.53 0.44 0.37 -0.29 0.31 -0.56 -0.55 -0.48
Slovenia -0.12 -0.37 0.55 0.66 0.72 -0.31 0.46 -0.82 -0.69 -0.49
Slovakia -0.23 -0.30 0.34 0.27 0.14 -0.15 -0.04 -0.66 -0.05 -0.15
Note: Reported are Kendall’s rank correlation coefficients: (a) no transformation of the variables and of debt,
(b) detrended variables and debt.
3.2 General remarks to specification and estimation
Tables 7 to 15 in the Appendix report results of various statistical tests performed in EViews. Prior
to the VAR analysis, the data series were tested for unit roots using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller
and Phillips-Perron test (Table 7). The latter test is better suited for small samples and therefore
more informative in our context. Fiscal variables and GDP were found to be I(1), growth rates of
the GDP deflator and money supply are I(0) or I(1). The vector of the six endogenous variables is
thus I(1). The Johansen test (Table 8) suggests that multiple cointegration relations are present.
However, examining further the cointegration relations is not the goal of this paper, also because
the inherent relationships among the variables are modelled through the government budget con-
straint. Detrending or inclusion of deterministic trends is avoided and the VAR estimation proceeds
in levels (cf. e.g. Lutkepohl, 2013).
A set of tests and information criteria were applied to determine the appropriate order of the
VAR process. The tests suggest to include between 1 and 5 lags (Table 10). This suggestion has
been confronted with the stability condition check (Table 9) as well as with the Wald test on lag
significance (Table 11). As a result, the appropriate number of lags in endogenous variables has
been determined as 2 (Czech republic, Lithuania and Slovakia) or 3 (Hungary and Slovenia). Lags
in the exogenous variable, government debt, were set to 2 (Hungary) or 1 (all other countries).
The alternative model with debt as one of the endogenous variables ("debt in VAR") was estimated
in 2 (Czech republic and Slovakia) or 3 lags (Hungary, Lithuania and Slovenia). In order to deal
with the outliers, the following shift dummies were included in the regression: 2001q4 for Slovenia
(impact of the financial turmoil in Latin America), 2003q1 for the Czech republic (major revision of
the national accounts), 2008q4-2009q4 for Lithuania (impact of the Great Recession) and 2011q1
for Hungary (transfer of private pension fund assets to the state).
Estimated VAR residuals were submitted to normality, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity tests
in EViews. As is often the case in applied analysis, the multivariate test rejected normality of the
residuals (Table 12). The Portmanteau test (Table 13) found that the residuals are mostly autocor-
related. The Lagrange multiplier test (Table 14) indicated that residuals are serially independent.
The latter test is better suited for small samples and therefore more relevant in our context. The
White test (Table 15) did not reject homoscedasticity of the residuals’ variance.
The remainder of the work was taken to Matlab. Estimation of the SVARX model follows the
standard LS estimator as in Lutkepohl (2005, chapter 3). Having identified the reduced form,
simulations then proceed as set forth in Section 2. Initial conditions to each of the simulations are
described in detail below. In impulse response functions and historical decomposition, GDP, fiscal
variables and debt are converted to percentages of the no shock scenario GDP. All other variables
are expressed in original units. Results presented further in this section are computed under debt
feedback, unless indicated otherwise.
8
3.3 Fiscal policy effects
3.3.1 Estimated structural shocks
Figure 3 displays balances obtained as a difference between the structural shocks in revenue and
expenditure, which were uncovered in the identification step of the VAR exercise. By construction,
the structural shocks in fiscal variables are cleaned for any systematic response to movements
in GDP and other macroeconomic variables. These balances can thus be viewed as a possible
measure of the cyclically-adjusted fiscal stance (cf. e.g. Parkyn and Vehbi, 2014). The year 2009 is
an example when fiscal policy in the CEE-5 was loosened.
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Figure 3: Structural primary balance
Note: Shown are balances constructed from the estimated structural fiscal shocks (wtt − wxt ), and primary
balances (tt − xt), in percent GDP.
3.3.2 Impulse response analysis
The next couple of figures and tables report the estimated impulse response functions and illustrate
some of their properties. Response functions to fiscal shocks, and especially those of the GDP,
are often referred to as so-called fiscal multipliers. That concept encourages a simple way to
think about effects of policies. We would think of "constants" that will give us the resulting dollar
added GDP if we multiply the additional dollar invested. In the context of linear VAR models, the
multipliers are obtained from the estimated VAR coefficients by simple recursive multiplication. In
this model, however, feedback from an external nonlinear equation feeds in the linear VAR part.
The response coefficients cannot be obtained analytically. They are constructed as a difference
between the shock and no shock scenario, both of which are simulated in levels, starting from
non-zero initial conditions. Even if all else is equal, the response functions will depend on the sign
and size of the shock (does the fiscal instrument increase or decrease when the shock occurs and
by how much?), and on the initial conditions (how large is e.g. the starting debt ratio?). To borrow
a wording from Muir et al. , p. 8, "there is no such thing as a simple fiscal multiplier." Instead of
point-wise constants, we should want to think of response functions as of dynamic behaviours that
will follow given the set of critical conditions.
Figures 4 and 5 show response functions of the six variables to unexpected shocks in government
revenue and expenditure. Either of the shocks was set up as a positive shock (increase) and was
calibrated as one percent of the initial GDP. Initial conditions in GDP and debt were set as in the
last in-sample year (2013). Assumed is a zero primary surplus, i.e. both tt and xt equal the
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average of the two in the last in-sample year. Initial inflation and money growth are set to zero.
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Figure 4: Responses to a government revenue shock
A revenue shock (Figure 4) mostly yields a positive response in itself, inflation, interest rate, and
money supply growth. The response of GDP, government expenditure and debt is mostly negative.
The somewhat mixed signs may be attributed to the rather broad scope of revenue, comprising
also transfers, which are differently correlated with the business cycle and price developments
than revenue from various types of taxes.
Effects of expenditure shocks on macroeconomic variables are quite similar across CEE-5. An
expenditure shock (Figure 5) yields a positive response in itself, government revenue, GDP and
debt, and a negative response in interest rate and money growth. The responses in inflation are
mixed.
The negative response of the interest rate following an unexpected jump in expenditure is rather
counter-intuitive. Economic intuition dictates that higher government deficits increase debt, mak-
ing, in turn, its refinancing more costly. A possible explanation for the fall in interest rates may be
the relatively stronger, positive response of GDP to the expenditure shock, coupled with a rise in
government revenue (cf. e.g. Afonso and Souza, 2012, commenting on the results for the U.S.).
Table 3 summarises cumulative responses of GDP to fiscal shocks up to three years ahead. The
cumulative coefficients are expressed in percent of the no shock scenario GDP. A one GDP-percent
shock in government expenditure yields a 0.00 to 0.09 percent added GDP within the first year. The
cumulative 3-year coefficients range between 0.18 and 0.42. For the Czech republic, the estimated
1-year response is -0.18 (GDP would fall after an expenditure shock), cumulative 3-year response
is -0.66. A one GDP-percent shock to government revenue implies a sacrifice in GDP of 0.01 to 0.11
percent. In Lithuania, the estimated 1-year response is 0.13 (GDP would increase after a revenue
shock), the cumulative 3-year coefficient is estimated at -0.62.
Figure 6 visualises some of the response functions properties. Unlike in linear VAR models, re-
sponses obtained in a VAR model with debt feedback will feature asymmetry and nonlinearity, and
10
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Figure 5: Responses to a government expenditure shock
Table 3: Cumulative response coefficients of GDP
Czech r. Hungary Lithuania Slovenia Slovakia
Revenue shock
With debt feedb.
1y -0.01 -0.11 0.13 -0.05 -0.11
2y 0.01 -0.27 -0.18 -0.11 -0.28
3y 0.03 -0.41 -0.62 -0.05 -0.44
W/o debt feedb.
1y -0.02 -0.09 0.14 -0.05 -0.11
2y -0.01 -0.17 -0.17 -0.11 -0.28
3y 0.03 -0.24 -0.62 0.03 -0.44
Expenditure shock
With debt feedb.
1y -0.18 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.04
2y -0.46 0.25 0.14 0.22 0.12
3y -0.66 0.42 0.40 0.27 0.18
W/o debt feedb.
1y -0.16 0.07 -0.03 0.10 0.03
2y -0.38 0.14 0.01 0.23 0.10
3y -0.62 0.20 0.09 0.21 0.15
Note: The responses fall within the 90 percent confidence intervals obtained by bootstrapping.
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will depend on initial conditions. Figure 6a illustrates that a negative fiscal shock of the same size
will not yield an identical behaviour, just with an opposite sign. Figure 6b shows that an n-times
larger impulse will not yield an n-times larger response. The differences will grow with the size
of the impulse and with the length of the simulation horizon. Figure 6c compares responses of
GDP to fiscal shocks generated under two sorts of initial conditions: low interest rates and debt
ratio and high interest rates and debt ratio. Levels do matter in the sense that they will generally
amplify the response coefficients. Albeit being small, the differences between the responses illus-
trate more profound nonlinearities behind the government budget constraint, that will operate at
higher levels of debt or in times of larger imbalances.
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Figure 6: Properties of the response functions
Note: Shown are responses of GDP to a government expenditure shock (a-b) or to fiscal shocks (c).
Table 4 and 5 collect the evidence on fiscal policy effects in emerging economies, including the
CEE-5, known from the literature. More specifically, Table 4 compares the signs of the response
functions of GDP, inflation and interest rate. Table 5 collects response coefficients of GDP to fiscal
shocks up to three years ahead. The definition of the fiscal instruments is not identical across the
papers, though net tax revenue and spending are used in the majority of cases (recall Table 1 in the
introductory section). The use of government revenue and expenditure in this paper is motivated
by the inclusion of the government budget constraint.
Obviously, the evidence available in the literature is rather heterogenous in terms of response signs
(Table 4). The model with debt feedback as the headline model in this paper gives results closer
to theoretical models, or to relatively broader empirical specifications (Czech republic, Hungary).
The debt feedback might be one of the critical factors that help reconcile the findings in cases
where the literature is not unanimous. Examples include the response of GDP and interest rate to
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a revenue shock in the Czech republic, the response of GDP to an expenditure shock in Hungary,
or the response of GDP and inflation to an expenditure shock in Slovenia.
Regarding the size of GDP responses, the coefficients obtained under debt feedback conform to the
literature (Table 5). The estimates for emerging economies are typically small, below 0.5 within the
first year. One of the critical factors to the relatively lower effectiveness of fiscal policy, compared
to advanced economies, is the higher degree of openness (cf. e.g. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko,
2012, and Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh, 2013).
Table 4: Estimates of response functions for CEE-5
(a) (b)
Country Authors Model GDP infla-
tion
inter-
est
rate
GDP infla-
tion
inter-
est
rate
Czech r. Mirdala (2009) E + +- - + +- +-
Baxa (2010) E - +
Eller et al. (2011) E + -+ - - + +-
Franta (2012) E
structural - - - + + +
recursive + + + + + -
sign restrictions +0 + + + + -
Mirdala (2013) E - +
Dinu and Marinas (2014) E 0 + +
Stork and Zavacka (2010) T - - - +- - +
Klyuev and Snudden (2011) T - - - + + +
Ambrisko et al. (2012) T - + + + + +
Hungary Lendvai (2007) E - -
Mirdala (2009) E + +- -+ + + -+
Eller et al. (2011) E - - - + + +
Kotosz and Peak (2013) E -
Mirdala (2013) E - +
Dinu and Marinas (2014) E 0- + +
Algozhina (2012) T +-
Benk and Jakab (2012) T - +
Lithuania Karmelavicius and Klyviene (2012) E - -
Klyviene and Karmelavicius (2012) E -+
Mirdala (2013) E - +
Slovakia Mirdala (2013) E - +
Pecsyova (2013) E - - + +- - +
Slovenia Eller et al. (2011) E + + -+ +- + +-
Jemec et al. (2011) E -+ +-
Mirdala (2013) E - +
Dinu and Marinas (2014) E 0- + 0
Clancy et al. (2014) T + +- +
Note: Reported are signs of the response functions to a positive fiscal shock in the revenue side (a) and ex-
penditure side variable (b). Symbols used: E stands for empirical (VAR) model, T denotes theoretical model,
+ positive response, - negative response, 0 response close to zero; combinations of the symbols denote sign
reversion.
3.3.3 Historical decomposition of macroeconomic variables
Figure 7 below and Figures 11-13 in the Appendix show a historical decomposition of the macroe-
conomic variables, computed from initial conditions that replicate the historical pre-sample. The
decomposition suggests that the variables were driven mainly by macroeconomic shocks, and that
structural shocks in government revenue and expenditure contributed only to a minor extent. Ac-
cording to the estimates, during the Great Recession fiscal policy in the CEE-5 made mostly neutral
or minor positive contributions to GDP. In the period afterwards, it contributed positively in Slo-
vakia and Hungary. It needs to be said that these estimates are sensitive in various aspects, and
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Table 5: Response coefficients in emerging markets and open economies
Type of
shock
Authors Coverage 0 1y 2y 3y Notes
Revenue side
shock
Eller et al. (2011)
Czech r. 0.00 0.01 0.03
Hungary -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
Slovakia -0.02 -0.05 -0.1
Slovenia 0.01 0.02 0.02
Franta (2012) Czech r. 0.00 0.20 0.30 Recursive indentification.
Klyviene and
Karmelavicius
(2012)
Lithuania -0.17 0.18 0.49 0.26 Response to effective tax rate
shock, Choleski identification.
Pecsyova (2013) Slovakia -0.00 -0.15 -0.17 -0.23
Batini et
al. (2014)
Emerging markets
and low income
countries
Short-term multipliers. Median
value: 0.20, range: 0.00 to 1.00.
Expenditure
side shock
Eller et al. (2011)
Czech r. -0.00 -0.01 -0.04
Hungary 0.01 0.02 0.01
Slovakia -0.01 -0.01 0.00
Slovenia 0.01 0.00 -0.01
Franta (2012) Czech r. 0.23 0.32 0.35 Recursive indentification.
Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko
(2012)
OECD countries 0.11
(0.96 /
-0.58)
Estimate for open economies,
country and time fixed effects.
Mean response. In brackets
recessions / expansions.
Ilzetzki, Mendoza,
and Vegh (2013)
High income and
developing
countries
Estimate for open economies.
Impact multiplier -0.077,
long-run multiplier -0.46.
Pecsyova (2013) Slovakia 0.14 0.39 0.65 0.39
Batini et
al. (2014)
Emerging markets
and low income
countries
Short-term multipliers. Median
value: 0.30, range: -0.40 to
2.35.
Note: Reported are estimates as provided by the authors in tables. In Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Vegh (2013), the
estimates for open economies are reported in Figure 7. For Batini et al. (2014), the median value is my own
calculation, based on Tables A.3.1 and A.3.2. Most of the estimates are impulse response coefficients based on
VAR or theoretical models. If instead authors report multipliers or mean estimates, this is explicitly mentioned
under the Notes. Abbreviations used: 0 - immediate response coefficient, 1y/2y/3y - cumulative 1 year (4
quarters) / 2 year (8 quarters) / 3 year coefficient (12 quarters).
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depend on the initial conditions and identification matrix.
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Figure 7: Decomposition of GDP
3.3.4 Forecast error variance decomposition
Decomposition of the forecast error variance is reported in Table 16 in the Annex. According to
the estimates, fiscal shocks explain a minor part of the variance in macroeconomic variables. The
estimates are sensitive to ordering of the variables in the VAR and to the identification matrix.
3.4 The role of debt
3.4.1 Coefficients at debt lags
Table 6 reports coefficients at debt lags in the revenue and expenditure equation. The combination
of coefficients is stabilising w.r.t. government primary surplus in all of the CEE-5, though mostly
not statistically significant. Size of the resulting impact on government primary surplus varies from
country to country.
Table 6: VAR coefficients at lagged debt levels
tt xt tt xt tt xt
Czech r. Lithuania Hungary
bt− 0.0050 0.0008 bt− -0.0106 -0.0177 bt− 0.0524 0.0407
-0.40 0.05 -1.85 -2.49 1.36 0.57
Slovenia Slovakia bt− 0.0041 -0.0614
bt− 0.0161 -0.0002 bt− 0.0163 0.0025 0.11 -0.88
2.21 -0.02 3.17 0.33 Sum 0.0566 -0.0207
Note: Reported are estimated coefficients, beneath are t-statistics as supplied by EViews.
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3.4.2 Effects of debt shocks
Impulse responses following government debt shocks are shown in Figure 8. The shock is cali-
brated as a one percent increase in terms of initial GDP. Initial conditions are identical as in the
case of fiscal shocks (Section 3.3.2): GDP and debt as in the last in-sample year (2013), zero
primary surplus and zero initial inflation and money growth. According to the estimates, a shock
to debt mostly yields a positive response in itself, government revenue and GDP, and a negative
response in interest rates, government expenditure and money supply growth.
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Figure 8: Responses to a shock in government debt
The behaviour of bond yields following an unexpected increase in debt is counter-intuitive, very
much like in the case of an expenditure shock mentioned above. Economic intuition dictates that
higher debts pose a higher risk and should be more costly to refinance. The negative estimated
response reflects the inverted relation of bond yields and debt in levels which obviously dominates
the positive relation thereof in detrended levels (recall Table 2).
3.4.3 Impact of debt feedback
The impulse response analysis in Section 3.3.2 and 3.4.2 showed that both inclusion of the debt
feedback and the way it is implemented matter. The extent to which debt affects the rest of the
system, varies from country to country, and from one variable to another. As a general observation,
debt feedback most profoundly affects the responses of government revenue, GDP and interest rate,
especially following an expenditure shock (Figure 5). It would amplify the size of the responses,
and might also revert the sign. The estimated response of output is most strongly affected by debt
feedback in Hungary and Lithuania following an expenditure shock (Table 3).
Regarding the responses following a debt shock (Figure 8), the headline model "with debt feed-
back" and the alternative specification "debt in VAR" are unanimous about the sign of the responses.
16
However, the size thereof is somewhere from a half to a double for interest rates, GDP, government
revenue and expenditure.
Yet another way to illustrate the impact of the debt feedback provides Figure 9. It displays debt
paths over the forecast horizon of ten years, generated under debt feedback and without. Initial
conditions replicate the last few quarters of the sample period. Such an exercise was performed
e.g. in Cherif and Hasanov (2012) for the U.S., and Parkyn and Vehbi (2014) for New Zealand.
Similar to their results, the simulated out-of-sample debt path in the CEE-5 is stabilised under debt
feedback, but strongly explosive if debt feedback is omitted. Though implausible in dimension, I
think that the explosive debt path has something to say about fiscal policy. A future-oriented in-
terpretation warns that without balancing carefully expenditure and revenue, governments would
run into unbearably high indebtedness. Looking backwards, it were accumulated past deficits that
brought the levels of debt to where they stand recently. In that sense, the explosive debt path
extrapolates imbalances the historical data already contain. In analogy, the stabilised debt path
extrapolates past episodes of consolidation or balanced budgeting.
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Figure 9: Historical and simulated debt ratios
3.5 Robustness check
The results have been submitted to three sorts of robustness check:
1. To assess sampling uncertainty, the impulse response coefficients are re-estimated using boot-
strap methods (one-step bootstrap from VAR residuals in 1000 draws). Presented is the median
response.
2. The assumption is challenged that government revenue is predetermined w.r.t. government ex-
penditure within the VAR. Impulse response functions are generated using an alternative or-
dering with expenditure being predetermined w.r.t. revenue. Ordering of the other variables is
preserved.
3. To understand how much the recent crisis changed the conduct of fiscal policy and its effects,
impulse responses are generated based on VAR coefficients obtained from a shorter sample,
ranging from 1999q1 to 2008q3 instead of 2013q4.
Calibration of shocks and initial conditions are identical as in the headline estimates presented
above (Section 3.3.2).
Figure 10 shows that the headline estimates are robust in sign to either of the checks considered.
The magnitude of the response functions differs slightly. The additional estimates mostly fall within
the 90 percent confidence interval of the headline model.
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Figure 10: Comparison of response functions under modified specification
Note: Shown are responses of GDP to fiscal shocks.
Notwithstanding previous comments, a few caveats should be mentioned. Any empirical results
that can be obtained for the CEE-5 countries, are based on a relatively short sample, and will hold
so long the structural relationships of the economies remain unchanged. The estimated VAR coef-
ficients represent average past behaviour, which in part resulted from factors beyond the model,
such as integration process or economic convergence. The average estimates might disguise vul-
nerability of these economies that are largely dependent on external demand and bond market
sentiment. It would thus be appropriate in policy and forecasting to evaluate this empirical setting
to more in-depth theoretical models and consider a more complex set of country-specific shocks.
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4 Conclusion
This paper estimates effects of fiscal policies under explicit debt feedback in five CEE economies.
The SVARX model in Section 2, feeding in dynamics from the government budget constraint, fol-
lows Favero and Giavazzi (2007). Analysing the impact of debt dynamics on policy effectiveness is
still rather novel in the CEE-related literature.
Estimated coefficients of fiscal variables at lagged values of government debt are stabilising w.r.t.
the primary surplus. This has two major implications. First, simulated out-of-sample debt paths
are stabilised under debt feedback, but strongly explosive if debt feedback is omitted. Second, both
inclusion of the debt feedback and the way it is implemented matter to the rest of the model. In
particular, responses of GDP, interest rate and government revenue are larger under debt feedback
and might revert the sign. The estimated responses depend more strongly on debt feedback in
countries where the debt ratios are relatively high (Hungary, Slovenia) or have expanded rapidly
since the recent crisis (Lithuania).
Section 3 computes a rich set of empirical results, most of which have not been presented before,
such as response functions of variables to debt shocks and historical decomposition of the time
series under debt feedback. Unlike in linear VAR models, the impulse response functions depend
on the size and sign of the shock and on the initial conditions. The paper therefore compares the
results under a range of assumptions. Some of the results are highlighted as follows:q Government expenditure shocks yield small, expansionary effect on output, which is a result in
line with the previous literature. Inclusion of the debt feedback might help reconcile the findings
in cases where the literature is not unanimous about the sign of the response (e.g. Hungary,
Slovenia).q Based on the estimates of structural primary balances, fiscal policy in the CEE-5 was loosened
during the Great Recession 2008-09. Historical decomposition of output suggests that during
the crisis, fiscal policy made mostly neutral or minor positive contributions. In the period after-
wards, it contributed positively in Slovakia and Hungary. Overall, however, the macroeconomic
variables were driven mainly by macroeconomic shocks and only to a minor extent by fiscal
shocks.q Impulse responses under debt feedback have trailed the rather counter-intuitive relation between
government debt, GDP and interest rate, which was first pointed out in the correlation analysis.
Simple regressions might obviously not detect any negative causal effect between government
indebtedness and growth in the CEE-5. Of course, to draw serious conclusions on that issue, one
needs to take into account the fact that these are converging economies and their bond yields
have declined in the recent environment of low interest rates.
Further extensions of this work may proceed alongside several venues.q As a possible refinement, the fiscal variables may be broken down in structure, to identify the
effects of government consumption, investment, public employment, net taxes and various trans-
fers.q To further increase robustness of the findings, a set of alternative identification and estimation
strategies might be employed, such as e.g. in Franta (2012).q The specification in this model relied on the accounting consistency of the government debt data
which were expressed in terms of euros. With the increasing foreign currency exposure of the
public debt since the crisis, a break-down of debt to shares denominated in domestic and foreign
currency, as e.g. in Ilzetzki (2011), is another possible extension.q A further upgrade of the model might be tailored to address specific questions regarding the
countries of interest. It may incorporate country-specific factors beyond the general setting,
such as productivity growth, foreign direct investment, exposure to external demand shocks and
others.
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Annex
Table 7: Individual unit root test - Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP).
pit rt yt tt xt mt bt
ADF
Czech republic L L L (lin + c) L (c) L (c) L (lin + c) L (lin + c)
0.0000 0.0150 0.9581 0.5713 0.2173 0.2108 0.8147
Hungary L L L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L L (lin + c)
0.0000 0.1736 0.9277 0.6871 0.9057 0.1736 0.8019
Lithuania L L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L (c) 1D (lin + c)
0.0006 0.1864 0.8335 0.8818 0.9753 0.0695 0.2407
Slovenia L 1D (c) L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L 1D
0.0001 0.0149 0.6047 0.8788 0.9052 0.0001 0.0332
Slovakia L L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L L (lin + c)
0.0049 0.0049 0.7807 0.0642 0.3749 0.0163 0.9579
PP
Czech republic L L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L (c) L (c) L L (lin + c)
0.0000 0.0423 0.9675 0.4167 0.0869 0.0347 0.5099
Hungary L L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L L (lin + c) L L (lin + c)
0.0000 0.2388 0.9202 0.6712 0.2955 0.0008 0.8019
Lithuania L L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L L (lin + c)
0.0006 0.4683 0.803 0.8168 0.9683 0.0155 0.933
Slovenia L L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L L (lin + c)
0.0000 0.8842 0.9339 0.8553 0.9009 0.0001 1.0000
Slovakia L L L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L L (lin + c)
0.0000 0.0000 0.6243 0.0883 0.4012 0.0002 0.9338
Note: The null hypothesis assumes that there is a unit root. Reported are one-sided p-values under the most
extensive specification (transformation of the series and test equation) when the null hypothesis could not
be rejected. Lag length is based on the Schwarz information criterion. The Phillips-Perron test uses a kernel
sum-of-covariances estimator with Bartlett weights and Newey-West bandwith selection. Abbreviations used:
L - level, 1D - 1st order difference, c - intercept, lin - linear trend.
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Table 8: Johansen test on cointegration
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Test Type No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept
No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend
Czech republic trace test 5 4 4 4 4
max eig. test 5 4 4 2 2
Hungary trace test 6 6 5 3 3
max eig. test 3 2 2 3 3
Lithuania trace test 5 5 2 2 2
max eig. test 5 5 2 2 2
Slovenia trace test 2 3 2 3 3
max eig. test 2 2 2 3 3
Slovakia trace test 4 5 4 4 6
max eig. test 5 5 4 4 4
Note: Reported is the number of cointegrating relations per assumption on trend and type of test. Critical
values are based on MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) at 5% level of significance, assuming no exogenous
variables.
Table 9: Check of VAR stability
Eigenvalue Modulus
Czech republic 0.9102 - 0.0814i 0.9139
Hungary 0.9084 0.9084
Lithuania 0.9424 - 0.0263i 0.9428
Slovenia 0.9656 - 0.0342i 0.9662
Slovakia 0.9626 0.9626
Note: Reported are inverse roots of the characteristic polynomial with the largest modulus.
Table 10: VAR lag length
LR FPE AIC SC HQ
Czech republic 2 2 2 1 1
Hungary 2 5 5 1 1
Lithuania 4 5 5 1 1
Slovenia 5 5 5 1 5
Slovakia 1 1 1 1 1
Note: Reported is the appropriate order of the VAR as suggested by the test, based on critical values at 5%
significance level and allowing for 5 lags at maximum. Abbreviations used: LR - sequential modified likelihood
ratio test, FPE - final prediction error, AIC - Akaike information criterion, SC - Schwarz information criterion,
HQ - Hannan-Quinn information criterion.
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Table 11: Wald test on lag exclusion
1st lag 2nd lag 3rd lag
Chi-squared p-value Chi-square p-value Chi-square p-value
Czech republic 222.7 0.000 71.7 0.000
Hungary 187.8 0.000 59.5 0.008 73.4 0.000
Lithuania 191.3 0.000 61.7 0.005
Slovenia 302.5 0.000 80.6 0.000 72.4 0.000
Slovakia 154.8 0.000 32.8 0.622
Note: The null hypothesis assumes that the coefficients at the specific lag are zero. Reported is the joint test
statistics from Chi-square distribution with 36 degress of freedom.
Table 12: Multivariate tests of VAR residuals
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera
Cs Dof Pv Cs Dof Pv Cs Dof Pv
Czech republic 1.7 6 0.947 23.0 6 0.001 24.7 12 0.016
Hungary 1.6 6 0.949 49.8 6 0.000 51.5 12 0.000
Lithuania 32.5 6 0.000 44.2 6 0.000 76.7 12 0.000
Slovenia 11.3 6 0.079 45.3 6 0.000 56.6 12 0.000
Slovakia 35.5 6 0.000 118.3 6 0.000 153.8 12 0.000
Note: The null hypothesis assumes that the residuals are multivariate normal. Reported are the joint test
statistics, based on Choleski orthogonalisation of the residual variance-covariance matrix. Abbreviations used:
Cs - Chi-square test statistics, Dof - degrees of freedom, Pv- p-value.
Table 13: Portmanteau test on autocorrelation of residulas
Czech r. Hungary Lithuania Slovenia Slovakia
Lag adj. Q-st. prob. adj. Q-st. prob. adj. Q-st. prob. adj. Q-st. prob. adj. Q-st. prob.
3 81.4 0.000 83.7 0.000 61.3 0.005
4 132.1 0.000 128.0 0.000 121.0 0.000 117.9 0.000 102.5 0.011
5 179.0 0.000 167.3 0.000 148.7 0.006 161.1 0.000 152.1 0.003
6 221.2 0.000 211.0 0.000 183.1 0.015 198.0 0.000 176.9 0.033
7 256.0 0.000 255.9 0.000 208.4 0.072 232.9 0.000 215.9 0.035
8 292.7 0.000 287.1 0.000 249.7 0.058 281.9 0.000 250.7 0.053
9 338.2 0.000 336.8 0.000 274.5 0.158 314.6 0.000 304.2 0.014
10 382.2 0.000 377.5 0.000 322.0 0.082 339.6 0.000 338.8 0.021
Note: The null hypothesis assumes that there is no autocorrelation up to a specified number of lags. Reported
are the adjusted Q-statistics and p-values. Tested are only lags larger than the VAR order.
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Table 14: Lagrange multiplier test on residual serial correlation
Czech r. Hungary Lithuania Slovenia Slovakia
Lag LM-st. prob. LM-st. prob. LM-st. prob. LM-st. prob. LM-st. prob.
1 34.4 0.546 28.8 0.798 68.6 0.001 39.2 0.327 44.1 0.165
2 39.9 0.300 40.8 0.266 60.0 0.007 35.0 0.517 37.0 0.423
3 26.5 0.875 45.8 0.128 20.7 0.981 44.9 0.146 26.9 0.863
4 46.6 0.110 47.8 0.090 33.1 0.608 56.7 0.015 35.7 0.481
5 53.3 0.032 37.4 0.404 24.4 0.930 45.8 0.127 43.3 0.187
6 42.6 0.208 38.7 0.348 31.0 0.707 38.3 0.365 23.5 0.946
7 35.5 0.493 49.0 0.073 21.4 0.974 42.2 0.220 31.3 0.693
8 32.5 0.637 43.9 0.171 36.5 0.444 48.4 0.082 28.8 0.796
9 41.8 0.233 55.8 0.019 21.2 0.976 28.5 0.811 48.2 0.084
10 44.4 0.159 37.7 0.390 46.0 0.122 25.3 0.910 28.5 0.807
Note: The null hypothesis assumes that there is no serial correlation at the specified lag. Reported are test
statistics from the Chi-square distribution with 36 degrees of freedom.
Table 15: White test on heteroscedasticity of residulas
LM-statistics degrees of freedom p-value
Czech republic 570.1 567 0.455
Hungary 840.4 861 0.686
Lithuania 620.1 567 0.061
Slovenia 782.4 819 0.816
Slovakia 544.7 546 0.508
Note: The null hypothesis assumes that the residual variance is homoscedastic. Reported are joint test statistics
from Chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom as indicated, no cross-product terms are included.
2000 2005 2010
−2
0
2
Czech r.
2000 2005 2010
−2
0
2
4
Hungary
2000 2005 2010
−2
0
2
4
Lithuania
2000 2005 2010
−1
0
1
2
Slovenia
2000 2005 2010
−2
0
2
Slovakia
 
 
pit rt yt τt xt mt
Figure 11: Decomposition of the GDP deflator growth rate
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Figure 12: Decomposition of the M2 growth rate
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Figure 13: Decomposition of the government bond yield
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